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ABSTRACT 
Electrical safety in the industrial process plant plays an important role to ensure 
overall safety of the chemical plant, but most of the time this subject has been largely 
ignored leading to major accidents in the plant. Due to this reason, many researchers 
find that it is important to understand completely the electrical system to avoid any 
accident in the plant. Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis tool is widely used 
as qualitative tool to identify potential hazards that can cause major accidents in the 
plant, while the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) method is widely used to estimate the 
probability of occurrences of the hazards. However, they have never been 
implemented vigorously to identify potential hazards due to electrical equipment and 
system failure. Thus, the main objective of this project is to provide a framework for 
systematic investigation of the problems in process plant due to electrical equipment 
and system failure. This project consists of analysis that is done to complement the 
need for detailed study of the electrical hazard. The analysis will include both 
qualitative HAZOP analysis approach to identify the possible hazards and a 
quantitative FTA assessment to rank the hazardous event accordingly for direct 
implementation in industrial case study. The tools developed will provide a detail 
review of chemical plant safety focusing on electrical equipments and system design. 
At the end of the study, the analysis will help to provide suggestion to improve the 
design, installation, operation and maintenance procedures in order to optimize the 
safety and operability in the plant. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
Electrical safety is very critical for any electrical system and equipment operating in 
the hazardous area such as in the power plant and chemical plant. Hazard and 
Operability (HAZOP) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) tools are the basic components 
in developing the tool to perform the electrical hazard analysis in this project. The 
abbreviation for the tool developed will be called ELHAP assessment in the entire 
report. ELHAP is derived from "Electrical Hazard and Probability" phrase because 
the tool not only identifies all of possible hazards, but it provides probability for 
major hazards. In addition, "hap" here also means fortune or luck, in which if it is 
combined with the "electricaf' term at the front syllable, it can be interpreted as 
bringing luck or fortune to the electrical system or to the plant in general since 
electrical safety analysis is a very crucial element for safe operation in chemical 
plant. 
Detailed study is required to do thorough analysis of the problems due to electrical 
system and equipment failure. All of the components in the electrical system need to 
be identified and analyzed from the Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) or 
Single Line Diagram (SLD) of the specific plant. Similar approach to HAZOP 
method will be used to identify all possible causes of the problems in which a series 
of guidewords will be introduced as a systematic approach for further analysis. Once 
the causes are recorded, the safety team involves will list all of the consequences and 
any recommendation deemed appropriate. During the analysis, if the consequence is 
very siguificant in which it involves considerable amount of loss, or major harm to 
the personnel, FTA tool will be implemented to calculate the probability in order to 
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predict the likelihood of occurrences of the hazard. If the hazard has very high 
probability, then the recommended actions should be taken into consideration 
irrespective of cost or changes it will make. Hazard with higher probability must be 
prioritized to optimize the safety. It is aimed that the tools developed will be used as 
a practical and systematic framework to analyze and minimize the potential hazards 
due to electrical equipments and system failure, to ultimately optimize the safety and 
operability in the plant by improving the system design, installation, operation and 
maintenance procedures. This is to comply with the safety analysis purpose which is 
to reduce the risks as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) in any workplace. 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
HAZOP analysis tool is widely used as qualitative tool to identify potential hazards 
that can cause major accidents in the plant. However, this tool has never been 
implemented vigorously to identify potential hazards due to electrical equipment and 
system failure. In this project, FT A method will be implemented as an additional 
component along with the HAZOP analysis as the basic component and it will be 
used as a quantitative tool to rank the hazardous events accordingly. The 
combination of both methods will provide a newly developed systematic tool to 
make sure that it is more structured, appropriate and efficient for direct 
implementation in industrial case study. It is not the intention of this project to 
duplicate the current tools but it is intended to provide alternative tools for the safety 
analysis and to complement with the current available tools. 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Method + Method 
(HAZOP) (FTA) 








1.3 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF STUDY 
The main objectives of this research work are: 
• To develop qualitative review or assessment of the problems due to electrical 
equipment and system failure in the plant by using HAZOP methodology 
approach 
• To develop quantitative analysis tool based on FTA to rank the hazardous 
events 
• To test the framework and tool developed using industrial case study 
The scope of work for this project is mainly to provide a new framework for 
systematic identification and analysis of electrical hazards in the process plant due to 
electrical equipments and system failure. The framework or tool developed will be 
directly implemented in the industrial application to test for its efficiency and 
suitability. The project is considered significantly valuable due to the following 
reasons: 
i. There is very limited detailed research that has been done on the same subject 
(electrical safety) so far. HAZOP approach is considered as one of the most 
complete guide for safety analysis but it mainly covers process units in 
general rather than auxiliary plant such as power generators. 
ii. Combination of HAZOP and FT A approaches will provide a more detailed 
safety analysis. Many researchers only focus their researches on how to 
automate usage of HAZOP and FTA tools separately instead of combining 
them in a new single tool. 
iii. The tool developed will help to provide stringent decision on actions that 
involve high cost or major changes to the design due to safety issues since it 
not only analyzes the potential hazards, but it gives probability for hazards 




2.1 SAFETY ANALYSIS 
Process hazard analysis (PHA) ensures equipment safety and identifies the possible 
hazards that may arise as a result of equipment malfunctions and deviations of 
process variables (temperature, pressure, etc) from normal operation, and it uses 
various different techniques such as fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis 
(ETA), what-if analysis, and Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis (1]. 
A system can be considered safe if it is free from accidents and unacceptable loss. 
Hazard in the system is a state or condition of the system that can, in the presence of 
a stimulus from the environment, lead to an accident or loss. Environment here 
refers to location or surroundings where the system operates. M. Berry (1998) stated 
that in order to make sure that a system is safe, the most important key are the 
identification of hazards and an analysis of what to do about the hazards (2]. 
In some cases, the cause of a hazard can be identified, and then it can be controlled 
or eliminated. For some other cases, often it is impossible to predict in advance all 
possible causes of all possible hazards. Thus, it is important to gather as much 
information as possible about a particular system to hope that this information allows 
detection of the causes of all hazards before they lead to accidents (2]. 
Currently a number of analysis techniques are used for safety analysis. The used 
analysis techniques can be grouped into quantitative techniques and qualitative 
techniques. Qualitative techniques compare and classify safety based on experience 
of the team that analyzes the hazard, while the quantitative techniques compare and 
classify safety based on calculation results using mathematical models. 
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According to Rouvroye et al.(2002), all techniques can be used to analyze the safety 
of industrial processes but the results will be different from each other due to 
different analysis techniques that start with different actions, end with different 
actions and follow different path in between start and finish. The authors suggested 
that the analysis technique that covers the most aspects relevant to the specific 
situation is used to produce the best result [3]. 
Thus it is very important to provide a detailed study specifically designed for 
electrical system to cover more aspects related to electrical safety. 
2.2 ELECTRICAL HAZARD 
Electricity has been long recognized as a serious workplace hazard, exposmg 
employees to electrical shock, electrocution, burns, fues, and explosions [4]. 
Electrical injury is caused by current passing through the body. The damage and 
injury to the body are proportional to the amount of current through the body and the 
current density [ 5]. 
Successful accident prevention relies to a large extent on knowledge about the causes 
of accidents. The causes of electrical fatalities at work, according to Williamson et 
al.(l998) can be classified into four major factors which are: 
1. Environmental events: events or conditions resulting from the location of the 
accident; these conditions could not have been changed at that point in time 
(e.g., low lighting, wet floor or cramped conditions). 
ii. Equipment events: events resulting from breakage or malfunction of 
machinery or tools that occur at that point in time. 
iii. Medical events: events resulting from the current state of physical well-being 
(e.g., heart attack or diabetic or epileptic episode). 
iv. Behavioral events: events resulting directly from human involvement (e.g., 
leaning too far into the path of machinery, touching an electrically charged 
object, etc.). [6] 
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It is very important to identifY and analyze the possible hazard in the process plant 
that can be caused by all of the above factors including the equipment events, in this 
case due to electrical equipment and system failure to make sure that the plant 
operation is as safe as reasonably practicable (ALARP). 
2.3 EFFECTS OF ELECTRIC CURRENT 
An electric shock can result in anything from slight tingling sensation to immediate 
cardiac arrest. The severity depends on the following factors: 
i. The amount of current flowing through the body 
ii. The current's path through the body 
iii. The length of time the body remains in the circuit 
iv. The current's frequency 
Burns are the most common shock-related injury. An electrical shock can result in an 
electrical burn, arc burn, thermal contact burn, or a combination of burns. Electrical 
burns occur when electric current flowing through tissues or bone, generating heat 
that cause tissue damage. Arc or flash burn results from high temperature caused by 
an electric arc or explosion near the body. Thermal contact burns occur when the 
skin touches hot surfaces of overheated electric conductors, conduits, or other 
energized equipments [4). 
Appendix A provides more details of general relationship between the amount of 
current received and the reaction to the body when current flows from the hand to 
foot in the basis of 1 second reaction time. 
2.4 QUALITATIVE METHOD 
Qualitative method is a type of hazard analysis that implements the experience and 
expertise in particular subject to analyze the hazards. There are a number of 
approaches that can be used to qualitatively analyze the hazard and one of them is to 
use hazard and operability method. 
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Hazard and operability study is a methodology for identifying and dealing with 
potential problems in industrial processes, particularly those which would create a 
hazardous situation or a severe impairment of the process. It is commonly known as 
HAZOP. It is said to be the most widely used method of hazard analysis in the 
process industries, notably the chemical, petrochemical and nuclear industries. 
2.4.1 HAZOP analysis 
In this project, HAZOP will be used as a basic qualitative tool to identify the 
possible hazard by means of achieving specified design intentions of a particular 
plant. The design intentions here refer to the specific purposes of designing the plant. 
HAZOP involves a team of experts to do the analysis in which it allows the members 
to brainstorm their opinions using their experience from within their specific fields 
of expertise. This method applies to processes either existing or planned for which 
the design information is available. The HAZOP team will need to identify the 
possible significant deviations that can affect each of the intention by referring to the 
P&ID of the plant, as well as to determine the related causes and consequences. 
This procedure requires certain standard that need to be followed, which is to use a 
series of guidewords provided combining with the parameters that can cause 
deviations to each of the design intention. The combination of guidewords and the 
parameters will provide the cause of the possible deviations, and later they will be 
extended further to identify the consequences of the deviations. The deviations must 
have certain significance or consequences for them to be accepted as possible 
hazards. In this project, this is where quantitative FTA method will be integrated 
with HAZOP method to rank the possible hazards accordingly to make sure that high 
level risk is being prioritized. The current standard guide words used in HAZOP 
tools are as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: The standard current guide words used 
(Source: http://en. wikipedia. orglwiki/Hazop) 
Guide words Meaning 
NO OR NOT Complete negation of the design intent 
MORE Quantitative increase 
LESS Quantitative decrease 
ASWELLAS Qualitative modification/increase 
PART OF Qualitative modification/ decrease 
REVERSE Logical opposite of the design intent 
OTHER THAN Complete substitution 
EARLY Relative to the clock time 
LATE Relative to the clock time 
BEFORE Relating to order or sequence 
AFTER Relating to order or sequence 
To make sure that specific focus is made to hazard related to electrical equipments 
and system failure, a series of physical parameters will be suggested. If the 
combinations between guide words and the physical parameters are meaningful or 
have certain siguificance, they are considered as potential deviations. Once the 
causes and consequences of each potential hazard have been determined and 
established, the system or operation being studied can be modified to improve its 
safety. 1n this project, certain recommendations will be provided along with specific 
causes of deviations to make sure that the plant safety can be optimized. 
2.5 QUANTITATIVE METHOD 
Quantitative method uses calculation results using mathematical models to assess the 
risk of identified possible hazards. This method is important to rank each of the 
possible hazards according to the level of risk it contains, and to what extent it is 
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significant to be taken into consideration. The risk level here may depend on the 
likelihood of occurrence of the hazards, how often they occur (frequency), and how 
large are the impacts or consequences of the entire events (injuries or fatalities). Two 
most widely used methods in determining the risk level of the hazards are Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). 
2.5.1 Fault tree analysis method 
Fault Tree Analysis or FTA method is used widely as a tool for quantitative risk 
assessments. It attempts to model and analyze failure processes of engineering 
systems. FTA is composed oflogic diagrams that display the state of the system and 
is constructed using graphical design techniques to analyze top-level event that leads 
to possible hazards in term of sub-events, followed by lower order events, which 
eventually leads to individual events that have caused the top-level event. The basic 
elements of a fault tree may be classed as (1) the top event, (2) primary (basic) 
events, (3) intermediate events and ( 4) logic gates. The top event is normally some 
undesired event. Typical top events are flanunable or toxic releases, fires, explosion 
and failures of various kinds. Primary (basic) events are events that require no 
further development. Intermediate events are the events in the tree between the top 
event and the primary events at the bottom of the tree. Logic gates define the logic 
relating the inputs to the outputs. The two principal gates are the AND gate and the 
OR gate. The output of an AND gate exists only if all the input exist. The output of 
an OR gate exists provided at least one of the input exists [7). 
Figure 2: A Fault Tree Analysis diagram 
(Source: http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/lmage:F ault _jree.png) 
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2.5.2 Basic Fault Tree Symbols 
Figure 3 shows the basic symbols of the events used in FTA method, while Figure 4 
show the basic gate symbols used in the method. 
Primary Event Symbols 
0 Basic Event 
Q ConditioningEvent 
0 UndevelopedEvent Q ExtemalEvent 
Figure 3: Primary event symbols used in FTA 




u Exclusive OR 
,w Priority AND 
0 Inhibit 
' 
Figure 4: Gate symbols used in FT A 
(Source://http://en. wikipedia.orgl) 
2.5.3 Limitation of FTA 
Although obtaining the exact top event probability of the FTA is one of the most 
important aims in any analysis, it is a difficult problem for a reasonably large scale 
system with complex structure such as a chemical plant. According to S. Yanagi et 
al.(2008), the complex representation of FT A diagram for such plant are caused by 
several type of dynamic behaviors that exist in the analysis such as sequence 
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dependency [8]. The limitation of reliability of FTA method in modeling the 
dynamic systems has also been discussed by Bucci et al. (2008) [9]. 
Markov modeling is an advance technique that can be used for dynamic system and 
time dependant failures but many engineers do not feel comfortable with Markov 
modeling and its fundamental mathematical background [10]. This project however 
does not consider dynamic properties of the system which will end up making the 
analysis more complex than it should be. In addition, electrical equipment and 
system failures usually do not significantly involves dynamic behaviors. 
FTA can be used because it explicitly expresses how equipment failures and system 
failures can lead to potential hazards in a graphical representation that is easy to 
understand. It identifies major risk contributors and combinations of primary 
failures (and human errors) that lead to an undesirable incident. In particular, it 
quantifies benefits associated with process safe guards and compares risk-reduction 
measures quantitatively in terms of safety. It is a structured methodology and well 
documented, ready to modify according to system changes [10]. 
2.5.4 Failure rate 
In order to calculate the probability or failure distribution of top events, probabilities 
or failure distributions of all basic events are required. Dearth of failure rate data and 
the large uncertainty associated with the data is a considerable problem in the 
application of FTA. With data collection and exchange efforts from both the 
government agencies and industry, this problem is slowly being ameliorated [10]. 
Failure rates depend on various factors including the function of the equipment, the 
definition of failures, the process conditions, and the maintenance plan. The ideal 
situation for a reliability study is to have sufficient plant data from identical 
equipment from the same process. However, in many cases, in-house data are not 
always available. For new plants, there are essentially no historical failure rate data. 
In those cases, generic data from external sources must be used [10]. 
There are various sources for failure rate database such as The Data Acquisition 
Working Party of the Mechanical Reliability Committee of the Institution of 
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Mechanical Engineers in the United Kingdom, Guidelines for Process Equipment 
Reliability Data with Data Tables by American Institute of Chemical Engineers, and 
Offshore Reliability Data Bank (OREDA) (1984, 1988, 1997, and 2002) [10] [11] 
[12]. A comprehensive compilation of failure rate and event data can also be found 
in Loss Prevention in the Process Industries Volume 3 (Lees, 1996) (13]. 
FTA in this project will use available Failure Rate Data of components and processes 
in the basic events from the above mentioned sources to estimate the probability of 
the top event. 
2.5.5 Failure probability 
The Failure Rate Data shows the average component failure over a period of time. 
This is called the failure rate and it is represented by J.l with units of faults/time. The 
units used are usually failures per 106 hours. The probability the component will not 
fail during the time interval (0, t) is given by a Poisson distribution [14]. 
R(t) = e·~t 
(2.1) 
R = Reliability 
J.l =Failure rate (assumed constant), as t--> oo the reliability goes to 0 
The complement of the reliability is called the failure probability, P and is given by 
(2.2) 
P = Probability 
J.l =Failure rate (assumed constant), as t--> oo the reliability goes to 1 
The failure probability is the value that is used in the probability calculation for 
every event. The sources of failure rate data available depend on user. It may be 
obtained from external -sources such as the literature and data banks. Alternatively 
they may be collected within the works. 
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2.6 CURRENT TOOLS AVAILABLE 
There are established indices such as the Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI), the 
Mond Index, and the Instantaneous Fractional Annual Loss (IFAL) Index which can 
be used for systematically identifying hazards and providing a method of ranking 
priorities. 
The Dow F&EI is the most widely used hazard index. It was originally developed by 
the Dow Chemical Company in 1964 to assist in the selection of fire protection 
methods. The analysis divides a plant into separate process units and assigns indices 
based on material properties, process conditions, areas of exposure, and other 
damage factors to derive the base maximum probable property damage (MPPD). 
Loss control credits are then applied to adjust MPPD to calculate actual MPPD. The 
guide has been updated several times but still only covers process units rather than 
auxiliary plant such as power generators [10). 
The Mond Index was developed by Imperial Chemical Industry (ICI) for the 
chemical industry, after the Flixborough disaster. The hazard is assessed in a similar 
way to the Dow F&EI index but introduces additional considerations. Initial 
assessments of fire, explosion and toxicity are carried out for each process unit. 
Offsetting factors for prevention and protection measures are then assigned and 
combined with initial indices. Finally, an overall risk rating is derived from 
individual fue, explosion, and toxicity indices. It provides a more comprehensive 
treatment of hazards from materials, reactious and toxicity [10). 
The IF AL index was originally developed for insurance assessment purpose by the 
Insurance Technical Bureau. It requires dividing the plant into blocks, and the 
contribution of each major item of process equipment is determined according to 
process factors, engineering factors, and management factors. Frequency and size of 




3.1 ELHAP PROCEDURES 
Electrical Hazard and Probability (ELHAP) assessment consists of two main parts 
which are: 
1. Hazard Identification (Qualitative Method): using similar approach to 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis which uses guidewords in 
performing the analysis. 
ii. Hazard Ranking (Quantitative Method): using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
probability calculation method to rank the hazard according to the level of 
risk it possesses. 
In order to integrate the two methods together, HAZOP and FTA approach must be 
synchronized, thus hazards are identified by using keywords and guidewords starting 
from the top event, similar to FTA analysis. In standard HAZOP method, 
guidewords is used to initiate causes of sub events from the deviation of parameters 
that will lead to the top event, but in the ELHAP, the top event is identified as the 
starting point. This to make sure that it is easier to calculate the probability of each 
identified hazard during the hazard ranking procedure later. 
Special keywords and guidewords are introduced since original HAZOP guidewords 
are not suitable to be used to identify hazards starting from the top event. In the 
analysis, only top event that contributes to acceptable amount of risk is being ranked 
accordingly. This is to make sure that the assessment is as practical as possible. 
Details of the methodology are discussed further in the following sections. 
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3.2 TOOLS 
3.2.1 Software Package 
Usage of the following software is required ifELHAP is going to be implemented in 
an automated application form in the future: 
i. Microsoft Excel: Software to develop table for the basic HAZOP analysis, 
and to rank the hazardous event accordingly using FT A tool. 
ii. Visual Basic Application: Software that will be used to link the Microsoft 
Excel to the specific P&ID or SLD of the plant. 
3.3 IMPLEMENTATION 
It is important that the tool developed, ELHAP can be implemented in the real 
industrial cases. Safety consideration is very important in both design stage and also 
for on-going operation, thus the tool developed is aimed to be used for both 
situations. For this purpose, the following materials are required: 
1. Process description 
2. Process flow sheet in the form of Single Line Diagram (SLD) 
3. Equipment and instrument specifications 
4. Layout drawing 
5. Operating procedures 
6. Maintenance procedures 
Figure 5 shows the suggested implementation inputs and outputs of the ELHAP. At 
the end of the study, ELHAP will provide suggestion to improve the system design, 
operation and maintenance procedures to optimize the safety and operability in the 
overall plant. 
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DESIGN STAGE ON-GOING 
OPERATION 
I 
DATA I DATA 
! + 
ENGINEERING DESIGN OPERATION AND 
MAINTENANCE 
PROCEDURES 






DESIGN RECOMMENDATION IMROVEMENT 
MODIFICATION TO PROCEDURES 
REPORT 
Figure 5: Implementation ofELHAP in system design, operation and 
maintenance procedures for new system design and on-
going plant operation. 
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3.4 SAFETY TEAM 
For an effective analysis, ELHAP requires involvement of group of experts in safety 
and electrical system since it is a team approach tool similar to HAZOP analysis. The 
following members are the suggested persons to form a team for the analysis: 
I. Team leader 
ii. Safety Officer 
iii. Process plant operators 
iv. Electrical maintenance engineer 
v. Electrical design engineer 
vi. Electrical technical manager 
Vll. Others as required 
3.5 PROCEDURES 
Based on the HAZOP approach which introduces parameters and guidewords and 
also the FTA concept, the following method is the suggested framework for ELHAP 
study: 
i. Specific component of interest is specified in the process and instrumentation 
diagram (P&ID) of the process plant. The single line diagram (SLD) is 
usually used to focus on specific design intent of the electrical operation. 
ii. Possible hazards are indentified to determine the type of possible hazards 
related to the specified component in general. The following are the possible 
hazard keywords suggested for each of the component: 
• Electrical shock 
• Fire 
• Explosion 
• Physical Threat 
• Toxicity 
• System Failure 
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iii. Exposure situation is determined according to the specified hazard keyword 
to identify the general condition/situation of the hazards. For each type of 
hazard, the following exposure situation is suggested: 
• Electrical shock - direct contact, indirect contact 
• Fire -normal, chain reaction, lightning 
• Explosion- chemical, mechanical, electrical 
• Physical Threat- individual, surroundings 
• Toxicity- chemical, biological, physical 
• System Failure- no power, low power, malfunction 
iv. Exposure elements in the form of guidewords are applied in this stage to 
analyze the causes of the problems. Guidewords suggested consists of the 







v. Deviation from normal operation is determined according to the selected 
guidewords. For each of the operation parameter, the following deviation is 
suggested: 
• IDENTIFY- Fail to identify, false identification 
• OPERATE- Fail to operate, fail to open, fail to close, fail to isolate 
• CONTROL- Fail to control, false control 
• DISPLAY- Fail to display, false display 
• MAINTAIN -Failto maintain 
• FUNCTION- Fail to function 
v1. Detailed causes of the hazards are determined according to the specified 
deviation. 
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vii. Consequences of the hazards are determined. 
viii. If the consequences are significant, FT A probability calculation method is 
used to rank the hazards to make sure the highest risk hazard can be 
prioritized followed by the second highest, etc. 
ix. Suitable recommendations will be suggested for further actions. 
The procedure suggested above is simplified in the flow chart as shown in Figure 6. 
The detail definition for each of the tenns (hazard keywords, exposure situation, 
guide words, etc) used in the procedure above can be found in the Appendix B. 
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Figure 6: Suggested procedure for ELHAP 
[ FINISH 
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The infonnation gathered during the procedure above can be recorded in a table as 
suggested in Table 2. The Fault Tree Analysis will be perfonned only if the 
consequences are very significant in which it gives major impact to the system 
design or plant operation. It will be discussed further in the following Section 3.6. 
21 
Table 2: Suggested table for ELHAP study 
Exposure Probability 
Hazard Exposure Elements (*FTA 
Item Keyword Situation (GUIDEWORDS) Deviation Causes Consequences result) Recommendation Action 
Electrical 
Shock Direct contact IDENTIFY Fail to identify 
False 
Indirect contact identification 
Fire Normal OPERATE Fail to operate 
Chain reaction Fail to open 
lightning Fail to close 
Fail to isolate 
Explosion Chemical 
Mechanical CONTROl Fail to control 
Electrical False control 
Physical 
Threat Individual DISPLAY Fail to display 
Surroundings False display 
Toxicity Chemical 
Biological MAINTAIN Fail to maintain 
Physical 
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System No power FUNCTION Fail to function 
Failure Low power 
Malfunction 
*FTA result is in the form of probability of occurrences of each of the hazardous event ranging from 0 to 1.0. As the probability increases, 
the level of risk the hazard possesses increases. 
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A simple example of the ELHAP analysis using the procedure as described in the 
Section 3.5 is as shown in Table 3 below. In this analysis, a component of the 
electrical system, in this case a gas turbine system is chosen as the subject. 
Table 3: Example of analysis using suggested procedures 
Component Gas turbine system 
Type of hazard Electrical shock 
Exposure situation Direct Contact 
Exposure element OPERATE 
(Guideword) 
Deviation Fail to open 
Cause Switch fail to open 
Consequences Short circuit 
Recommendation Possibility to install additional 
over current protection 
FTA result 0.0-1.0 
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3.6 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)METHOD 
3.6.1 FTA Procedures 
In the ELHAP analysis, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) method will be implemented to 
rank the hazardous events if the events possess significant consequences and they 
can be considered as major events. The significant consequences here may include: 
i. Events which are considered very dangerous to the personnel operating the 
machines or equipments during the operation where they may cause major 
injuries or in the worst case scenario; fatality to the personnel. 
ii. Events which contribute to considerable amount of loss to the plant 
operation, or to the company in general in term of money, or other resources. 
Hazard ranking is required to rearrange all of the events with very significant 
consequences according to their probability and eventually to prioritize the event at 
which its consequences are more significant among all other events. The following 
are suggested procedures to rank the hazardous events accordingly based on FTA 
method: 
iii. The top event or the hazardous event which is identified from the previous 
methodology is determined 
iv. Possible faults or causes that must occur for the top event to occur are listed 
by branching down the top event to the smaller sub-events. 
v. During this branching procedure, sequential, parallel or combinations of sub-
events are considered to make the analysis as accurate as possible. This can 
be done by using standard fault tree symbols. In this project, only "AND" and 
"OR" gates are used since they are widely used to represent the causes for 
each of the event. 
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vi. Boolean algebra is used to quantify fault tree with event probabilities in order 
to determine the top event probability. 
vii. Event with highest probability ranks first, and it must be prioritized when 
actions are being taken to mitigate the hazard. 
3.6.2 Probability Calculation 
Before proceeding with the top event probability, the probability value of each of the 
basic event is calculated by using the following equation: 
(3.1) 
P = Probability 
ll = Failure rate (assumed constant), as t -> oo the reliability goes to 1 
( faults/1 06 h) 
t =time (106 h) 
[14] 
As discussed before in the Section 2.5.4, the failure rate data can be determined 
either from manufacturer or from failure rata data handbooks. Failure rate data 
collected from various established sources for some selected electrical equipments 
together with their respective values of probability can be found in Appendix D. 
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3.6.3 Boolean algebra 
Once the Fault Tree diagram has been developed, Boolean equations can be derived 
to evaluate the probability estimates for the sub-events. Combination of the sub-
events probabilities will give the probability for top event. In this project, focuses 
will be made on "OR" and "AND" gates. The probabilities of the sub-events 
involving "OR" gates simply acts in additive manners while the probability of the 
sub-events involving AND gates will act in multiplicative manner. The basic formula 
for "OR" and "AND" gate cases are as follow: 
p 
P=Pl xP2 (3.2) 
PI P2 
p 
I p = 1-(1- Pl)(l-P2) (3.3) 
Pl P2 
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For more complex tree diagram, in the case an event is connected to its causal events 
by an AND gate, the probability of its occurrence is given by the relationship: 
n 
P=TI P(Ei) 
i = 1 
(3.4) 
For a case where all the events are connected to an event via an OR gate, the 




i = 1 
(3.5) 
P =the probability of occurrence of the event innnediately above the AND 
or OR gate 
P (Ei) =probability of occurrence of events immediately below the AND or 
OR gate 
n = the number of events immediately below the OR gate 
n =the symbol for multiplication 
(15] 
The complete guide for Boolean algebra for Fault Tree Analysis can be referred to in 
Appendix C. In this guide, formulas to determine probability involving 
combinations of both "AND" and "OR" gates in various situations are shown. 
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CHAPTER4 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 INDUSTRIAL CASE STUDY 
Implementation in industrial case study is very important to make sure that the 
framework developed is not just theoretically sound but it is also practical for real 
life applications. The location for the main industrial case study has been chosen to 
be at the Lumut Power Plant (LPP) in Lumut, Perak. The reason for selection of 
Lumut Power Plant as the location for industrial case study is because: 
1. Lumut Power Plant is located nearby, thus it is easier for the research to be 
done at anytime during the commencement of the semester. 
ii. The focus of this study is specifically more onto electrical system, thus it is 
great if it is done directly at the electrical power system before doing direct 
implementation at electrical system in process plant. 
Based on the procedures discussed in Chapter 3, an industrial case study will be 
implemented at Lumut Power Plant. For this purpose, the single line diagrams for the 
whole plant and gas turbine have been obtained from the power plant. Please refer to 
Appendix E for the single line diagram of the whole plant. 
Additional case study was done for the 11 OV Alternate Current Uninterruptible 
Power Supply (AC UPS) at PETRONAS Fertilizer Kedah Sendirian Berhad 
(PFKSB) to further test the suitability of the ELHAP assessment. Please refer to 
Appendix G for the single line diagrams of the AC UPS system. 
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4.2 LPP ffiGH VOLTAGE GAS TURBINE SYNCHRONIZATION STEPS 
4.2.1 Gas turbine system 
Gas turbine system is one part of the power plant system in Lumut Power Plant. 
Please refer to Appendix F for the gas turbine single line diagram. A gas turbine 
also known as combustion turbine is a rotary engine that extracts energy from a flow 
of combustion gas. It has an upstream compressor coupled to a downstream turbine, 
and a combustion chamber in-between. 
According to Lumut Power Plant safety guidelines, high voltage apparatus include 
any equipment and conductors which are normally operated at a voltage of 15.75 kV 
and above. High voltage synchronization steps involve a series of high voltage 
switching. High voltage switching is defined as operation of high voltage 
switchgears, isolators or other methods of making or breaking a circuit. If a high 
voltage circuit can be energized or reenergized by means of low voltage equipment, 
such energizing or reenergizing shall be regarded as high voltage switching [16]. 
4.2.2 Safety clearan£es from live £onductors 
When work is to be carried out in the vicinity of any exposed high voltage conductor 
which is or can be made live, the section which is made dead for work to be carried 
out shall be defined as far as possible by the use of approved barriers or approved 
roping arrangements. The minimum clearance from such exposed conductor to 
ground level or platform or access way shall be as given in the Table 4 below: 
Table 4: Minimum clearance from exposed conductor for different voltage 
Rated Voltage Clearance 
Metric Imperial 
2.1 kV & 6.6 kV 2590mm 8'6" 
15.75 kV 2740mm 9'0" 
275kV 4570mm 15'0" 
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4.2.3 Isolation step 
The following are the isolation steps that need to be obeyed before the 
synchronization steps or other testing take place: 
a) Equipment shall be made dead by opening the appropriate circuit breakers 
and Isolators links. 
b) Isolation shall be obtained by opening Isolators or links, or racking out circuit 
breakers or removing fuses. Where appropriate, air isolation together with 
positive action to ensure that the closing mechanism is inoperative, will be 
acceptable instead. 
c) Neutral point connections which may be subject to a rise of potential shall be 
as in paragraph (a) above if deemed required by the electrical competent 
person 
d) Possible back feeds from the Low Voltage sides of power transformers, 
voltage transformers or auxiliary transformers shall be removed by isolating 
the Low' Voltage sides of the transformers, as in paragraph (a) and/or (b) 
above. 
4.2.4 Synchronization steps 
Based on the guidelines given, the high voltage gas turbine synchronization steps 
involve pre-condition step and high voltage switching step as follow: 
4.2.4.1 Pre Condition 
i. Equipment in open status- S38,S30,S34,W36,W30,W34,S48,S40,S44 
ii. M3 De-energized 
iii. R3 Energized GT3l,GT32,GT33,Ayer Tawar 4 
iv. GT31 back feed via R3-M96-M90-M93 
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4.2.4.2 Switching Steps 
1. GT31 is running and already synchronized through R3 at operating watt via 
circuit breaker. 
ii. Open M90 by DCS command and GT31 stay idle 
iii. Open M90 > Open M96 > Close M94 
rv. Black sync M90 via M94 to dead M3 bus> Completed 
v. Open M90 by power plant> Close W36 > Close W34 > Close W30 
energized M3 with TNB power 
vi. HV sync M90 through M94 to M3 
vii. Complete HV CB sync 
4.2.5 ELHAP Analysis 
Based on the procedures developed in Section 3.5, the following table, Table 5 can 
be constructed for the gas turbine system. This table has been developed according to 
the suggested hazard keywords, exposure situations, guidewords, and associated 
deviations as shown in Table 2. Three major hazards are identified in this case study. 
The FT A results in the Table 5 are obtained using previously explained method in 
Section 3.6. The details of the FTA analysis for both hazards are as shown in 
Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively. 
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Table 5: ELHAP analysis for gas turbine synchronization system 
Type of Exposure Exposure element Deviation Causes Consequences *FTA Recommendation 
hazard situation (GUIDEWORDS) 
Electrical Direct OPERATE Fail to open Fail to open S38, S30, System is not isolated 0.02722 Make sure every isolation steps 
shock contact and S34 properly - may cause are followed properly 
Fail to open S48, S40, injury to personnel 
Check for any failure of the and ranging from burn to 
S44 death switches before proceeding 
Fail to open W30, W34, with the next procedures 
and W36 
Fail to Fail to isolate ST34, May cause injury to 
isolate GT32, or GT31. personnel ranging 
from burn to death 
Explosion Electrical OPERATE Fail to open Fail to open M90, M96 Electrical current fault 0.8380 Make sure every isolation steps 
flow -very high are followed properly 
Fail to Fail to close M94 voltage flow may Check the controller before 
close cause sudden 
Fail to isolate M3 bus explosion damaging proceeding 
Fail to the circuit 
isolate 
FUNCTION Fait to Circuit breaker at Over voltage flow Make sure circuit breaker at 
function GT31, fail to function may cause electrical GT31 is working properly 
explosion. 
DISPLAY False DCS display that the Over voltage flow DCS command system must be 
display M90 as open (should be may cause electrical checked to make sure it works 
closed) explosion. properly 
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System No power MAINTAIN Fail to Fail to maintain all Gas turbine Make sure to maintain 
Failure maintain required power supply synchronization steps adequate power supply from 
from TNB power cannot be completed TNB power generation station 
generation station 
Low MAINTAIN Fail to Fail to maintain Gas turbine Make sure to maintain 
power maintain adequate power supply synchronization steps adequate power supply from 
from TNB power cannot be completed TNB power generation station 




4.2.6 FTA Method 
The fault tree analysis diagram can be developed to track all of the sub-events or 
faults that may contribute to occurrences of the major hazard identified in the gas 
turbine system. The failure rate data of the basic events and its associated probability 
offailure are taken from Appendix D. The Fault Tree Analysis is conducted only for 
event that produces acceptable amount of risks or consequences, in this case, the 
electrical shock and explosion. Fault Tree Analysis diagrams for electrical shock and 
explosion hazard in gas turbine are as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively. 
Figure 7 show that the probability of electrical shock in the gas turbine system is 
calculated to be 0.02722; while Figure 8 shows that the probability of the explosion 
in the gas turbine system is 0.8380. It shows that the probability of explosion in the 
gas turbine system is very high, and the recommended action must be taken into 
consideration more seriously before starting any operation related to the gas turbine 
system. 
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1il to open 
S38 
'=0.2092 
Electrical Shock during Gas 
Turbine Synchronization 
Fail to isolate ST34 
p = 0.009156 
Fail to open 
S30 
p = 0.2092 
Fail to open 
S34 
p = 0.2092 
Fail to open 
W30 
p = 0.2092 
0 = basic event 
B =AND gate 
P=0.02722 
Fail to isolate GT31 
p = 0.009156 





Fail to open 
S38 
P= 0.2092 





Fail to isolate GT32 
P= 0.009156 
Fail to open 
S30 
p = 0.2092 
Fail to open 
S34 
p = 0.2092 
Figure 7: FTA analysis for the electrical shock hazard in the gas 
turbine system 
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fails to function 
Fail to isolate M3 bus 
P=0.009156 






Fail to open 
M90 
p =0.2092 
= basic event 
=AND gate 
Fail to open 
M96 
p = 0.2092 
Fail to close 
M94 
p = 0.2092 
0 = undeveloped event . 
~ =OR gate 
Figure 8: FTA analysis for the explosion hazard in the gas turbine 
system 
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4.3 PFKSB llOV ALTERNATING CURRENT UNINTERRUPTIDLE 
POWER SUPPLY (AC UPS) 
llOV AC UPS units comprises of rectifier, inverter, by-pass system and stand-by 
battery for the installation. The following Figure 9 shows typical arrangement 
layout- Parallel Operation extract of AC UPS from PETRONAS Technical Standard 
(PTS). Detail drawing is as shown in Appendix G. General design consideration and 




l!'IICJ:l' _tJ•U.\.'ii RFQH. 
1. IF REQUIRED. TRidiSFORVERS 'TO e.E lNC\..tJOED IN BYP.ISS Cl~CUITS. 
2 . .l<J..L SWITCHES Cl.OSEO UHLESS S'l'ATEOOT~ERWS£.. 
Figure 9: Typical arrangement of AC UPS system 
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STATIC 
4.3.1 ELHAP Analysis 
The following Table 6 shows ELHAP Assessment for the Alternating Current 
Uninterruptible Power Supply (AC UPS) at PFKSB. The major hazard identified 
during the operation of the AC UPS is electrical shock during maintenance 
procedures and system failure during the operation. 
4.3.2 FTA Analysis 
For this case study, both events contributes to considerable amount of risk since 
electrical shock may cause injury (or death) to personnel, while system failure may 
cause shutting down of operation, which will consequently affect the overall plant 
operation. This may cause considerable amount of losses to the company since the 
plant need to be operated continuously most of the time to cater for the product 
demand. The fault tree (FTA) analysis for the AC UPS system is as show in Figure 
10 and Figure 11 respectively. The failure rate data of the basic events and its 
associated probability of failure are taken from Appendix D. The FTA results show 
that the recommended steps that may reduce or eliminate the system failure event 
must be prioritized due to its higher probability of occurrences than the electrical 
shock hazard. 
The higher the probability of occurrences for a particular top event or hazard in the 
system, the higher it ranks among the hazards identified. By doing the probability 
calculation, hazard with high likelihood to occur can be prioritized, followed by less 
risky hazards. If the system design or the operating and maintenance procedures are 
to be improved, more focus must be given to the improvement related to prevention 
of hazard with highest probability first. 
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Table 6: ELHAP analysis for the AC UPS system 
Type of Exposure Exposure element Deviation Causes Consequences FTA Recommendation 
hazard situation (GUIDEWORDS) 
Electrical Direct OPERATE Fail to open Fail to open switch at System is not isolated 0.08593 Make sure every isolation steps 
shock contact maintenance by pass properly- may cause for maintenance procedures are 
line injury to personnel followed properly 
ranging from burn to 
Check for any failure of the Fail to open switch at death 
static by-pass line switches before proceeding 
May cause injury to with the next procedures Fail to Fail to isolate Static 
isolate UPS unit 1, and Static personnel ranging 
UPS unit2 from burn to death 
System Malfunction FUNCTION Fail to Rectifier, inverter fail to System fail to operate 0.3002 Make sure to use equipments 
Failure function function properly may result in that follow the standards, check 
shutting down of for equipment failure regularly. 
Fuse fail to function operation 
No/Low MAINTAIN Fail to Fail to maintain System fail to operate Make sure to maintain 
power maintain adequate power supply properly may result in adequate power supply from 
from the AC input shutting down of AC input 
operation 
FUNCTION Fail to Backup Ni-Cd Battery Make sure the battery fulfills 
' 
operate fail to function/ standard requirement, check the 
disconnected batt~ regularly 
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Electrical Shock during 
maintenance at AC UPS 
Fail to isolate 
Static UPS Unit 1 
P=0.04393 
Fail to open switch at 
maintenance bypass 
line I 
Fail to open switch 
at static bypass line I 
p = 0.2092 
P=0.2092 
0 =basic event 
(ANDj =AND gate 
p = 0.08593 
Fail to isolate 
Static UPS Unit 2 
P=0.04393 




Fail to open switch 
at static bypass line 2 
p =0.2092 
Figure 10: FTA analysis for the electrical shock hazard at AC UPS 
System 
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System Failure at AC UPS 
System 
p = 0.3002 




Fuse fails to 
function 
P= 0.0055 
No power output from 
AC input 
Battery fail to 
operate/disconnected 
P=0.0219 p =0.0022 
6 
Inverter fails to 
function 
p = 0.2223 
0 = basic event (> = undeveloped event 
B =AND gate ~ =OR gate 
Figure 11: FT A analysis for tbe system failure at AC UPS system 
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4.4 COMPARISON WITH OTHER TOOLS 
There are established indices which can be used for systematically identifying 
hazards and providing a method of ranking priorities in a chemical plant. Three most 
widely used indices are the Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI), the Mond Index, 
and the Instantaneous Fractional Annual Loss (IFAL) Index (10]. The following 
Table 7 shows the side by side comparison between ELHAP and the other three 
available methods. 
Table 7: Side by side comparison between ELHAP and other methods 
Specification ELHAP DowF&EI Mondlndex IFALindex 
Field ofstudy Electrical Developed by Dow Developed by Originally developed 
System in Chemical Company Imperial by Insurance 
Chemical Plant in 1964 for Chemical Technical Bureau 
Chemical process Industry for for insurance 
safety Chemical process assessment purpose 




Specific safety Hazards in Originally for fire Fire, explosion Insurance 
coverage electrical protection. Revised and toxicity in assessment 
system- several times to chemical plant. 
equipment and include explosion Provides more Hazards related to 
system failures in chemical plant. focus on material, chemical process-
reaction and ignition; emission in 
toxicity the process 
Hazard HAZOP Own approach. Own approach. Own approach -
Identification Approach with Defining material, Basically use the dividing plants into 
simple and determine same method as blocks, and 
guidewords and general and special Dow F &EI with contribution of 
safety terms. process hazards. addition hazard for each 
considerations block is based on 
various factors 
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Ranking FTA approach Maximum Probable Extended Process factors, 
Method to calculate the Property Damage assessment of engineering factors probability (MPPD), calculated DowF&EI- and management 
using available from Chemical considering factors to estimate 
Failure Rate Exposure Index additional factors. damage. Own 
Data. This is a (CEI) based on Own method of method of ranking 
standard used material factors, ranking 
everywhere. hazard factors, 
process factors. 
Own method of 
ranking. 
Complexity Simple and easy New safety terms Safety terms New safety terms 
to understand (MPPD, and other based on Dow (process factors, 
guidewords and related factors) F&Eiplus engineering factors, 
safety terms additional factors management factors) 
Transposable Yes-can be No - only for fire No - only for fire, Yes but must be 
easily extended and explosion. explosion and modified to include 
for chemical Calculation method toxicity other considerations 
process for electrical is not which may cause it 
considered. to be more complex. 
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CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
Combination of the concept of HAZOP and FTA methods to form a new framework 
for safety analysis, ELHAP is a very good initiative for a complete risk assessment 
especially in the area of electrical equipment and system failure which has not been 
discovered thoroughly. The HAZOP approach will help to identify all of the possible 
hazards in the electrical system, while the use of FT A method will help to prioritize 
the major hazards accordingly. At the end of the analysis, ELHAP will be able 
analyze and minimize the potential hazards due to electrical equipments and system 
failure to ultimately optimize the safety and operability in the plant by improving the 
system design, installation, operation and maintenance procedures. 
5.2 RECOMMENDATION 
The following are the recommendations in order to improve this project further: 
i. It is very useful if a method to estimate the probabilities of occurrences for 
sub-events can be developed so that the probability for the top event can be 
easily calculated without relying so much on the data from others. 
ii. It will be very useful if the identified major hazards can be ranked according 
to their severity in form of total cost of loss, number of fatality or injury and 
etc. in addition to ranking according to frequencies of likelihood to occur 
alone. This will provide more accurate probability distribution. 
iii. If possible, the developed framework can be integrated into user-friendly 
software for an easy and automated access to all hazard information of 
particular component in the electrical system. 
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APPENDIX A 
GENERAL RELATIONSIDP BETWEEN THE AMOUNT OF 
CURRENT RECEIVED AND THE REACTION 
Current Reaction 
Below I milliampere Generally not perceptible 
1 milliampere Faint tingle 
5 milliamperes Slight shock felt; not painful but 
disturbing. Average individual can 
let go. Strong involuntary reactions 
can lead to other injuries. 
6-25 milliamperes (women) 
Painful shock, loss of muscular 
control* 
9-30 milliamperes (men) 
The freezing current or "let -go" 
range.* Individual cannot let go, 
but can be thrown away from the 
circuit if extensor muscles are 
stimulated. 
50-150 milliamperes Extreme pain, respiratory arrest, 
severe muscular contractions. 
Death is possible. 
1,000-4,300 milliamperes 
Rhythmic pumping action of 
the heart ceases. Muscular 
contraction and nerve damage 
10,000 milliamperes occur; death likely. 
Cardiac arrest, severe burns; death 
probable 
* If the extensor muscles are excited by the shock, the person may be thrown away 
from the power source. 
Source: W.B. Kouwenhoven, "Human Safety and Electric ShocK', Electrical Safety 
Practices, Monograph, 112, Instrument Society of America, p. 93. November 1968. 
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APPENDIXB 
DEFINITION OF RELATED TERMS 
1. General type of hazards (Hazard Keywords) 
i. Electrical shock can occur upon contact of a human's body with any 
source of voltage high enough to cause sufficient current through the 
muscles or hair. The minimum current a human can feel is thought to 
be about 1 milliampere (rnA). 
ii. Fire is the heat and light energy released during a chemical reaction, 
in particular a combustion reaction. 
iii. Explosion is a sudden increase in volume and release of energy in an 
extreme manner, usually with the generation of high temperatures and 
the release of gases. 
iv. Physical Threat refers to any physical activities that can cause 
danger to the individuals. 
v. Toxicity is the degree to which a substance is able to damage an 
exposed organism. 
vi. System Failure refers to malfunction of part or the whole system of 
interest that contributes to sudden stop of the operation. 
2. Exposure Situation (specific types of hazard) 
Electrical Shock Direct Contact The personnel has direct contact with the 
exposed electrical parts 
Indirect Contact The personnel has indirect contact with the 
electrical elements such as electromagnetic 
waves. 
Fire Normal Normal fire caused by existence of 
adequate supply of oxygen, heat and fuel, 
without any further reaction that may 







Physical Threat Individual 
Surroundings 
Nonnal fire that is associated with further 
reaction or continuous or growing supply of 
fuel, oxygen and heat to be able to sustain a 
chain reaction. 
Fire that suddenly caused by lightning that 
may lead to nonnal or chain reaction fire. 
The most common artificial explosives are 
chemical explosives, usually involving a 
rapid and violent oxidation reaction that 
produces large amounts of hot gas. 
Strictly a physical process, as opposed to 
chemical or nuclear, eg, a the bursting of a 
sealed or partially-sealed container under 
internal pressure is often referred to as a 
'mechanical explosion'. Examples include 
an overheated boiler or a simple tin can of 
beans tossed into a fire. 
A high current electrical fault can create an 
electrical explosion by fonning a high 
energy electrical arc which rapidly 
vaporizes metal and insulation material. 
Also, excessive magnetic pressure within 
an ultra-strong electromagnet can cause a 
magnetic explosion. 
Physical hazard cause by individual 
carelessness or medical problems that lead 
to instabilities in orientation, abnonnalities 
in work, etc. 
Physical hazard cause by the environment 
where the personnel works due to 
surrounding problems such as instabilities 





System Failure Malfunction 
No power 
Low power 
Chemicals include inorganic substances 
such as lead, hydrofluoric acid, and 
chlorine gas, organic compounds such as 
methyl alcohol, most medications, and 
poisons from living things. 
Biological toxic entities include those 
bacteria and viruses that are able to induce 
disease in living organisms. 
Physically toxic entities include things not 
usually thought of under the heading of 
"toxic" by many people: direct blows, 
concussion, sound and vibration, heat and 
cold, non-ionizing electromagnetic 
radiation such as infrared and visible light, 
and ionizing radiation such as X-rays and 
alpha, beta, and garmna radiation. 
Part of the system or the whole system fails 
to function normally according to design 
intent, usually resulting from failure of 
electric circuit or other electrical 
components. 
Temporary loss of all electrical power 
source that result in sudden stop to the 
whole system operation. 
Temporary loss of part of the electrical 
power sources that leads to inability of the 
system to operate properly. 
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3. GUIDEWORDS (Exposure Elements) 
i. IDENTIFY- ability to recognize or select by analysis 
ii. OPERATE- function or control of something with respect to a 
machine or a process 
iii. CON1ROL- ability to direct a situation, process, etc to desired 
direction 
iv. DISPLAY- ability to show or demonstrate something or particularly 
data so that it may readily be seen. 
v. FUNCTION- ability to operate or work in a proper or particular way 
as designed 
4. Deviation from design intent based on Guide words: 
IDENTIFY Fail to identify Unable to identify 
False identification Misleading identification 
OPERATE Fail to operate Unable to operate 
Fail to open Unable to open 
Fail to close Unable to close 
Fail to isolate Unable to isolate 
CONTROL Fail to control Unable to control 
False control Misleading control 
DISPLAY Fail to display Unable to display 
False display Misleading display 




GENERAL RULES OF BOOLEAN ALGEBRA 
Mathema:W:al Engineering DesignaUon SyidJolism s.fflooiism 
(la) Xr.Y=Yr;X X·Y=Y·X Commutative Law 
(lb) XvY=YvX X+Y=Y+X 
(2a) Xr.(Y r;Z) = (Xr. Y) flZ X•(Y •Z) = (X• Y)•Z Associative Law 
X•(Y•Z) =(X•Y)•Z 
(2b) Xv(YvZ) = (XvY) vZ X+(Y+Z) =(X+Y)+Z 
(3a) Xr.(YvZ) = (Xr. Y) v(Xr.Z) X•(Y +Z) = X• Y + .X.Z Dis1ribulive Law 
X•(Y+Z)=X•Y+X·Z 
(3b) Xv(Yr;Z)=(XvY)r;(XvZ) X+Y·Z=(X+Y)o(X+Z) 
(4a) Xr.X=X X.X=X Idempotent Law 
(4b) XvX=X X+X=X 
(5a) Xr.(XvY) =X X·(X+Y)=X Law of Absorption 
(5b) Xv(Xr. Y) =X X+X·Y=X 
(6a) Xr.X'=cp x.x·=cp C oiqJlemenlation 
(6b) XvX'=O=I"' X+X'=O=I 
(6c) (X)'=X (X')'=X 
(la) (Xr.Y)' =XVY' (X• Y)' =X'+Y' de Morgan's Theorem 
(lb) (XvY)'=XhY' (X+Y)' =X'.Y' 
(8a) ¢r>X= cp cpoX=cp OperatiollS with cp and 0 
(8b) cj;vX=X cp+X=X 
(8c) cr.x=X O.X=X 
(8d) 0-,oX=O O.X=O 
(8e) cp'=O cp'=O 
(8f) O'=cp O'=cp 
(9a) Xv(XhY) =XvY X+X'.Y=X+Y These relationships are 
(9b) X'r(XvY') = Xh Y' = X'•(X+ Y) = X'• Y' = unnamed but are fre-
(XvY)' (X+Y)' quently useful in the 
reduction process. 
"'lhe S)lmboll io: on ... ""' din£1> td of 0 ~ d"igJ:l&t> thl U>~mml Sot.. In mgj!teeiing>101>.tioo. 0 io: ofunnplaced by I 
md(>lOyO. 
Source: NASA, Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Application Version 1.1, 
August 2002. (Website: http://www.hq.nasa.gov/officelcodeq/doctree/fthb.pdj) 
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APPENDIXD 
SELECTED FAILURE RATE DATA 
Instrument Faults/year R p Reference 
Guideline for Process 
Annunciators 0.0067452 0.9933 0.0067 Equipment Reliability Data 
Guideline for Process 
Batteries-Lead Acid (No output) 0.01971 0.9805 0.0195 Equipment Reliability Data 
Batteries-Nickel Cadmium (No Guideline for Process 
output) 0.00219876 0.9978 0.0022 Equipment Reliability Data 
Battery Chargers (No electrical Guideline for Process 
output) 0.066576 0.9356 0.0644 Equipment Reliability Data 
Guideline for Process 
Circuit Breakers -AC 0.01533 0.9848 0.0152 Equipment Reliability Data 
Guideline for Process 
Circuit Breakers -DC 0.033288 0.9673 0.0327 Equipment Reliability Data 
Controller 0.29 0.7483 0.2517 Lee's 
Controllers-Electrouic- Guideline for Process 
Panelboard (Single Loop) 1.7958 0.1660 0.8340 Equipment Reliability Data 
Guideline for Process 
Flame Detectors 3.78432 0.0227 0.9773 Equipment Reliability Data 
Guideline for Process 
Fuses 0.00555384 0.9945 0.0055 Equipment Reliability Data 
Heat Transfer Devices Guideline for Process 
(Catasthropic) 0.272436 0.7615 0.2385 Equipment Reliability Data 
Heat Transfer Devices (Leakage Guideline for Process 
> 1/4") 0.226008 0.7977 0.2023 Equipment Reliability Data 
Indicator lamp 0.044 0.9570 0.0430 Lee's 
Indicators-Temperatore- Guideline for Process 
Radiation Parameter 2.17248 0.1139 0.8861 Equipment Reliability Data 
Guideline for Process 
Inverters 0.251412 0.7777 0.2223 Equipment Reliability Data 
Motors-AC (Fail to run Guideline for Process 
properly) 0.133152 0.8753 0.1247 Equipment Reliability Data 
Motors-AC-Induction (fail to run Guideline for Process 
properly) 0.028032 0.9724 0.0276 Equipment Reliability Data 
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Motors-De (Fail to run Guideline for Process 
properly) 0.1971 0.8211 0.1789 Equipment Reliability Data 
Guideline for Process 
Recorders 0.219876 0.8026 0.1974 Equipment Reliability Data 
Guideline for Process 
Relays-Protective 0.0167316 0.9834 0.0166 Equipment Reliability Data 
Stepper motor 0.044 0.9570 0.0430 Lee's 
Switches-Electric-Flow Guideline for Process 
(Catasthropic) 0.234768 0.7908 0.2092 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Flow (Fail to Guideline for Process 
function when signalled) 0.036792 0.9639 0.0361 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Flow Guideline for Process 
(Function w/o signal) 0.0075336 0.9925 0.0075 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Level Guideline for Process 
(Catastrophic) 0.0152424 0.9849 0.0151 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Level Guideline for Process 
(Degraded) 0.014892 0.9852 0.0148 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Level (Fail to Guideline for Process 
function when signalled) 0.0014892 0.9985 0.0015 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Level Guideline for Process 
(Function w/o signal) 0.008103 0.9919 0.0081 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Pressure Guideline for Process 
(Catasthropic) 0.434496 0.6476 0.3524 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Pressure (Fail Guideline for Process 
to function when signalled) 0.003504 0.9965 0.0035 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Pressure Guideline for Process 
(Function w/o signal) 0.0006132 0.9994 0.0006 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Speed Guideline for Process 
(Catasthropic) 0.0042048 0.9958 0.0042 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Speed (Fail to Guideline for Process 
function when signalled) 0.0049932 0.9950 0.0050 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Speed Guideline for Process 
(Function w/o signal) 0.001314 0.9987 0.0013 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Temperature Guideline for Process 
(Catasthropic) 0.0199728 0.9802 0.0198 Equipment Reliability Data 
Switches-Electric-Temperature Guideline for Process 
(Fail to function when signalled) 0.029784 0.9707 0.0293 Equipment Reliability Data 
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Switches-Electric-Temperature Guideline for Process 
(Function w/o signal) 0.0101616 0.9899 0.0101 Equipment Reliability Data 
Transducers-Current to Guideline for Process 
Pneumatic 0.550128 0.5769 0.4231 Equipment Reliability Data 
Guideline for Process 
Transformers-Power (No output) 0.0221628 0.9781 0.0219 Equipment Reliability Data 
Transformers-Rectifier (No Guideline for Process 
output) 0.0093732 0.9907 0.0093 Equipment Reliability Data 
Transmitters-Differential Guideline for Process 
Pressure 0.574656 0.5629 0.4371 Equipment Reliability Data 
Transmitters-Differential Guideline for Process 
Pressure 1.90968 0.1481 0.8519 Equipment Reliability Data 
Transmitters-Electronic-Level- Guideline for Process 
Capacitance Probe 0.219876 0.8026 0.1974 Equipment Reliability Data 
Guideline for Process 
Transmitters-Pneumatic-Flow 0.95484 0.3849 0.6151 Equipment Reliability Data 
Transmitters-Pneumatic-Flow- Guideline for Process 
Differential Pressure 1.03368 0.3557 0.6443 Equipment Reliability Data 
Transmitters-Pneumatic-Flow- Guideline for Process 
Variable Area 0.843588 0.4302 0.5698 Equipment Reliability Data 
Guideline for Process 
Transmitters-Pneumatic-Level 1.23516 0.2908 0.7092 Equipment Reliability Data 
Transmitters-Pneumatic-Level- Guideline for Process 
Differential Pressure 0.870744 0.4186 0.5814 Equipment Reliability Data 
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SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM OF GAS TURBINE 
G £31 LINE AYCR TAWAr~ 4 
M;,>U L4f 
...... ~!.::! 
~~~» k-;~ L~> !::--;:';;;--!' 
,-F--=1 I ~-'"L_ _ _£v~o·o_ M"'." AU<; NO,J Me<> ( ~'M"'' "" ( (L<4 ___ "_:!9 ~~ '::-~~ 
1 . RFRFR"/F BUS NO.,, ----- t -~- -·-~-~ ~P;.g_ -~~-~ -rn I·.".O:I!iiiN:.<~.,..,,.;;;..,.,.,.._..[l 
r MAON BUS No.:> - - . . . 2~ (~I '~!· 
··· ~ ~ -· .... ~ ~- ·· ···-Ll·-~,, X"" r::pMH>O "'""~_..!!.4 ... "~~ '.<-03~•0] ~ 
ST.i4 GT33 GT32 
GT31 ; HV. CQ. Block NotworJ! 
Pro..,ondll!on Equipmootopen statuo S3B.S:lO,S34, W3S.W30.W34. S48,S40.S4-4 
M3 DO-enorgise1l 
R3 Energised GT31,GT32,GT33.A}•<>r Tawar 4 
GT31 l>ockfood "'" R3 - M%- M90 - M93 
Swltchrng stops. 1.GT31 rs running and already synchronised through R3 at. __ MW via generato: c.irr.uil breaker 
2.0pon M&O by DCS command and GT31 stay in idlo 
4.0pcn M!lO ,. Open M96 ,. Close M94 
5.1'llac~ sync M90 via M9~ lo dearJ M3 tws ,. Comptetod Block sync M90 to dead M3 bu~ 
O.Open M90 by Power plt:~nt :.-.. Close W3G ::. Close W34 :... Ciosc \N30 cncr9.izod' M5 with TNB pot.••m by TNB 
7 .HV sync M$0 through MG4 to M3 · 
8.TNB nonnali~ed HV swi1chyafd Clo~a~ S48,S44,S4.0 S38.SS4.S30 





.. LINE AYER TAWAR 4 
.;:;. 
1.45 
_ W34 MAIN BUS N0.3 MSIS ( .rM94 L46 ( {L44 S4..J [!] ~ ~ 
t RESERVE~ '"'3 t t ., EJ ~-1 m~n~-v--
W36~
MAIN BUS N0.3 S3a~ I M·~ ~ r M.N MH6 ~ ~ M... M.OO ~ L.~ ~ l 
~'w ~"" - M100 
M123 r ~121 llo M113 ~ ~111 llo M103 ~101 .. I , 
ST34 GT33 GT32 
GT31 : HV. CB. Black Network 
Pre-condition Equipment open status 838,830,834 , W36,W30,W34 , 848,840,844 
M3 De-energised 
R3 Energised GT31,GT32,GT33,Ayer Tawar 4 
GT31 backfeed via R3 - M96 - MSO- M93 
Switching steps 1.GT31 is running and already synchronised through R3 at MW via generator circuit breaker 
2.0pen M90 by DC8 command and GT31 stay in idle 
4.0pen M90 > Open M96 > Close M94 
5.Biack sync M90 via M94 to dead M3 bus > Completed Black sync M90 to dead M3 bus 
6.0pen M90 by Power plant > Close W36 > Close W34 > Close W30 energized M3 with TNB'power by TNB 
7 .HV sync M90 through M94 to M3 · 
8.TNB normalised HV switchyard Close 848,844,840 838,834,830 
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GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AC UPS SYSTEM 
Construdion Requirements 
• All batteries shall be of the nickel-cadmium (Nicd) type. 
• The nominal output of the DC UPS system shall be llOV DC supply. 
• The units shall be provided with an input harmonic filter and surge 
suppression device, as well as output filter. 
• Name, identification, instruction, and wiring plates: 
All name, identification, instruction and wiring plates shall be 
engraved with indelible inscriptions in the English language. 
Labels shall be of sufficient size to provide easy reading from 
normal operating & maintenance positions. Labels shall be 
provided to indicate the main functions of each service and 
control equipment. 
Plates mounted on the outside of the equipment shall be fixed of 
durable self-threading screws or pop-rivets. 
All labels except danger/ warning labels fixed on the surface of 
panel I equipment shall be engraved black lettering on white 
plastic material. 
Warning plate(s) or caution notice(s) shall be installed, 
identifying the danger point(s). This shall be in the compartment 
and/ or on the outside of the assembly. DANGERIW ARNING 
Labels shall be engraved with RED colour on white plastic 
material. 
Instruction Plate shall be provided wherever applicable and it 
shall be, if possible, in a pictorial manner. 
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Circuit labels shall be provided to allow easy and clear 
identification of the circuit from the front and back with the 
access doors open or closed. All trip wiring shall be identified 
with a red ferrule marked with the letter "T". 
Each item of the equipment shall have the manufacturer's rating 
plate with catalogues and I or serial nos. and other relevant 
information. 
• The enclosure shall provide a degree of protection of IP 41. 
• Ingress Protection 
• Cable Entry 
• Enclosure 
: IP41 (external), IP20 (Internal) . 
: Bottom entry . 
: Free floor-standing sheet steel cubicle 
Rusted inhibitor and chemical 
resistant 
epoxy paint. Metal shall be electro 
galvanized type. 
• Colour codes for all elec. equipment 
Indoor equipment : RAL 7035 (Light grey) 
• Battery Rack construction 
• Battery Rack finishing 
3 .2.3 Site/Service Conditions 
: Free Floor standing steel racks with 
diagonal earthing bossed, acid 
resistant, no hygroscopic. Leak 
reservoir under the battery stand. 
: Black Epoxy coated. 
The DC UPS unit shall be located inside a freely ventilated air-conditioned 
room. However all equipment shall be capable of operation occasion under 
following condition. 
• Maximum ambient air temperature : 40 °C 
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• Average DC UPS room air temperature : 20 °C to 
25 °C 
• Minimum ambient air temperature : 5 °C 
• Relative humidity not exceeding : 90% 
• Altitude not exceeding : l 000 m 
The sound pressnre level measnred at 1 m distance from the DC UPS, at any 
position, shall not exceed 70dB(A) at any load between zero and the rated 
output of the unit. 
The nominal system input voltage and frequency variations shall be as 
follows: 
• SuiJply Voltage :3 Phase415V 
• Supply Frequency :50HZ 
• Voltage Variations :Voltage ±10% 
• Frequency Variations : Frequency ± 5% 
The nominal output of llOV DC UPS system shall be 110V DC 50Hz 
supply. 
Source: PFKSB, PFKSB Plant Debottlenecking Project EPCC Of Gas Tnrbine 
Cogeneration System 
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